]> Cypherpunks repositories - gostls13.git/commitdiff
crypto/tls: accept HelloRetryRequest messages with only a cookie
authorFilippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Wed, 29 Apr 2020 22:31:50 +0000 (18:31 -0400)
committerFilippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Wed, 6 May 2020 16:20:51 +0000 (16:20 +0000)
Clients have to reject any HelloRetryRequest message that doesn't lead
to a change in the ClientHello. Instead, we were rejecting any HRR that
didn't select an alternative group, even if it sent a cookie, which
would change the CH.

The good news is that I know of no TLS servers that use or need HRRs
exclusively for cookies (which are mostly useful in DTLS as a way to
verify the source address). The bad news is that we poisoned the
ecosystem as Go 1.12 to 1.14 will reject such HRRs. Oops, hopefully no
one needed this.

No tests because neither Go nor s_server support cookies. This would
presumably get covered once we integrate BoGo.

Fixes #30149

Change-Id: I760fb1ded81148ac3096cf201cbc1e941374b83d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/231039
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
src/crypto/tls/handshake_client_tls13.go

index 8994591ee4232f3d5858d76242b5f5ab05786673..97122bd2202f45e0bdae81aa8e73ac89a83991b5 100644 (file)
@@ -176,51 +176,62 @@ func (hs *clientHandshakeStateTLS13) processHelloRetryRequest() error {
        c := hs.c
 
        // The first ClientHello gets double-hashed into the transcript upon a
-       // HelloRetryRequest. See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
+       // HelloRetryRequest. (The idea is that the server might offload transcript
+       // storage to the client in the cookie.) See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.1.
        chHash := hs.transcript.Sum(nil)
        hs.transcript.Reset()
        hs.transcript.Write([]byte{typeMessageHash, 0, 0, uint8(len(chHash))})
        hs.transcript.Write(chHash)
        hs.transcript.Write(hs.serverHello.marshal())
 
+       // The only HelloRetryRequest extensions we support are key_share and
+       // cookie, and clients must abort the handshake if the HRR would not result
+       // in any change in the ClientHello.
+       if hs.serverHello.selectedGroup == 0 && hs.serverHello.cookie == nil {
+               c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+               return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest message")
+       }
+
+       if hs.serverHello.cookie != nil {
+               hs.hello.cookie = hs.serverHello.cookie
+       }
+
        if hs.serverHello.serverShare.group != 0 {
                c.sendAlert(alertDecodeError)
                return errors.New("tls: received malformed key_share extension")
        }
 
-       curveID := hs.serverHello.selectedGroup
-       if curveID == 0 {
-               c.sendAlert(alertMissingExtension)
-               return errors.New("tls: received HelloRetryRequest without selected group")
-       }
-       curveOK := false
-       for _, id := range hs.hello.supportedCurves {
-               if id == curveID {
-                       curveOK = true
-                       break
+       // If the server sent a key_share extension selecting a group, ensure it's
+       // a group we advertised but did not send a key share for, and send a key
+       // share for it this time.
+       if curveID := hs.serverHello.selectedGroup; curveID != 0 {
+               curveOK := false
+               for _, id := range hs.hello.supportedCurves {
+                       if id == curveID {
+                               curveOK = true
+                               break
+                       }
                }
+               if !curveOK {
+                       c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+                       return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
+               }
+               if hs.ecdheParams.CurveID() == curveID {
+                       c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
+                       return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest key_share")
+               }
+               if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok {
+                       c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+                       return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
+               }
+               params, err := generateECDHEParameters(c.config.rand(), curveID)
+               if err != nil {
+                       c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
+                       return err
+               }
+               hs.ecdheParams = params
+               hs.hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: params.PublicKey()}}
        }
-       if !curveOK {
-               c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
-               return errors.New("tls: server selected unsupported group")
-       }
-       if hs.ecdheParams.CurveID() == curveID {
-               c.sendAlert(alertIllegalParameter)
-               return errors.New("tls: server sent an unnecessary HelloRetryRequest message")
-       }
-       if _, ok := curveForCurveID(curveID); curveID != X25519 && !ok {
-               c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
-               return errors.New("tls: CurvePreferences includes unsupported curve")
-       }
-       params, err := generateECDHEParameters(c.config.rand(), curveID)
-       if err != nil {
-               c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
-               return err
-       }
-       hs.ecdheParams = params
-       hs.hello.keyShares = []keyShare{{group: curveID, data: params.PublicKey()}}
-
-       hs.hello.cookie = hs.serverHello.cookie
 
        hs.hello.raw = nil
        if len(hs.hello.pskIdentities) > 0 {