}
func VerifyRSAPKCS1v15(pub *PublicKeyRSA, h crypto.Hash, hashed, sig []byte) error {
- size := int(pub.withKey(func(key *C.GO_RSA) C.int {
- return C.int(C._goboringcrypto_RSA_size(key))
- }))
- if len(sig) < size {
- // BoringCrypto requires sig to be same size as RSA key, so pad with leading zeros.
- zsig := make([]byte, size)
- copy(zsig[len(zsig)-len(sig):], sig)
- sig = zsig
- }
if h == 0 {
+ var out []byte
var outLen C.size_t
- out := make([]byte, size)
if pub.withKey(func(key *C.GO_RSA) C.int {
+ out = make([]byte, C._goboringcrypto_RSA_size(key))
return C._goboringcrypto_RSA_verify_raw(key, &outLen, base(out),
C.size_t(len(out)), base(sig), C.size_t(len(sig)), C.GO_RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
}) == 0 {
}
func TestBoringVerify(t *testing.T) {
- // This changed behavior and broke golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp.
- // Go accepts signatures without leading 0 padding, while BoringCrypto does not.
- // So the Go wrappers must adapt.
+ // Check that signatures that lack leading zeroes don't verify.
key := &PublicKey{
N: bigFromHex("c4fdf7b40a5477f206e6ee278eaef888ca73bf9128a9eef9f2f1ddb8b7b71a4c07cfa241f028a04edb405e4d916c61d6beabc333813dc7b484d2b3c52ee233c6a79b1eea4e9cc51596ba9cd5ac5aeb9df62d86ea051055b79d03f8a4fa9f38386f5bd17529138f3325d46801514ea9047977e0829ed728e68636802796801be1"),
E: 65537,
sig := fromHex("5edfbeb6a73e7225ad3cc52724e2872e04260d7daf0d693c170d8c4b243b8767bc7785763533febc62ec2600c30603c433c095453ede59ff2fcabeb84ce32e0ed9d5cf15ffcbc816202b64370d4d77c1e9077d74e94a16fb4fa2e5bec23a56d7a73cf275f91691ae1801a976fcde09e981a2f6327ac27ea1fecf3185df0d56")
err := VerifyPKCS1v15(key, 0, paddedHash, sig)
- if err != nil {
- t.Errorf("raw: %v", err)
+ if err == nil {
+ t.Errorf("raw: expected verification error")
}
err = VerifyPKCS1v15(key, crypto.SHA1, hash, sig)
- if err != nil {
- t.Errorf("sha1: %v", err)
+ if err == nil {
+ t.Errorf("sha1: expected verification error")
}
}