When deciding whether to forward cookies or sensitive headers
across a redirect, do not attempt to interpret an IPv6 address
as a domain name.
Avoids a case where a maliciously-crafted redirect to an
IPv6 address with a scoped addressing zone could be
misinterpreted as a within-domain redirect. For example,
we could interpret "::1%.www.example.com" as a subdomain
of "www.example.com".
Thanks to Juho Nurminen of Mattermost for reporting this issue.
Fixes CVE-2023-45289
Fixes #65065
Change-Id: I8f463f59f0e700c8a18733d2b264a8bcb3a19599
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/
2131938
Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley <tatianabradley@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker <bracewell@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/569340
Reviewed-by: Damien Neil <dneil@google.com>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Amedee <carlos@golang.org>
Auto-Submit: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
if sub == parent {
return true
}
+ // If sub contains a :, it's probably an IPv6 address (and is definitely not a hostname).
+ // Don't check the suffix in this case, to avoid matching the contents of a IPv6 zone.
+ // For example, "::1%.www.example.com" is not a subdomain of "www.example.com".
+ if strings.ContainsAny(sub, ":%") {
+ return false
+ }
// If sub is "foo.example.com" and parent is "example.com",
// that means sub must end in "."+parent.
// Do it without allocating.
{"authorization", "http://foo.com/", "https://foo.com/", true},
{"authorization", "http://foo.com:1234/", "http://foo.com:4321/", true},
{"www-authenticate", "http://foo.com/", "http://bar.com/", false},
+ {"authorization", "http://foo.com/", "http://[::1%25.foo.com]/", false},
// But subdomains should work:
{"www-authenticate", "http://foo.com/", "http://foo.com/", true},
// isIP reports whether host is an IP address.
func isIP(host string) bool {
+ if strings.ContainsAny(host, ":%") {
+ // Probable IPv6 address.
+ // Hostnames can't contain : or %, so this is definitely not a valid host.
+ // Treating it as an IP is the more conservative option, and avoids the risk
+ // of interpeting ::1%.www.example.com as a subtomain of www.example.com.
+ return true
+ }
return net.ParseIP(host) != nil
}
"127.0.0.1": true,
"1.2.3.4": true,
"2001:4860:0:2001::68": true,
+ "::1%zone": true,
"example.com": false,
"1.1.1.300": false,
"www.foo.bar.net": false,
{"http://www.host.test:1234/", "a=1"},
},
},
+ {
+ "IPv6 zone is not treated as a host.",
+ "https://example.com/",
+ []string{"a=1"},
+ "a=1",
+ []query{
+ {"https://[::1%25.example.com]:80/", ""},
+ },
+ },
}
func TestBasics(t *testing.T) {