From: Mike Samuel <mikesamuel@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2011 21:21:20 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: exp/template/html: flesh out package documentation.
X-Git-Tag: weekly.2011-09-16~25
X-Git-Url: http://www.git.cypherpunks.su/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=23fab11c47804b449f8498d8a21e54cb966fd989;p=gostls13.git

exp/template/html: flesh out package documentation.

R=nigeltao, r
CC=golang-dev
https://golang.org/cl/4969078
---

diff --git a/src/pkg/exp/template/html/Makefile b/src/pkg/exp/template/html/Makefile
index 620404b5ef..0398c78fd6 100644
--- a/src/pkg/exp/template/html/Makefile
+++ b/src/pkg/exp/template/html/Makefile
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ GOFILES=\
 	clone.go\
 	context.go\
 	css.go\
+	doc.go\
 	escape.go\
 	html.go\
 	js.go\
diff --git a/src/pkg/exp/template/html/doc.go b/src/pkg/exp/template/html/doc.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..12a3b1e580
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pkg/exp/template/html/doc.go
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+/*
+Package html is a specialization of package template that automates the
+construction of HTML output that is safe against code injection.
+
+
+Introduction
+
+To use this package, invoke the standard template package to parse a template
+set, and then use this package’s EscapeSet function to secure the set.
+The arguments to EscapeSet are the template set and the names of all templates
+that will be passed to Execute.
+
+    set, err := new(template.Set).Parse(...)
+    set, err = EscapeSet(set, "templateName0", ...)
+
+If successful, set will now be injection-safe. Otherwise, the returned set will
+be nil and an error, described below, will explain the problem.
+If an error is returned, do not use the original set; it is insecure.
+
+The template names do not need to include helper templates but should include
+all names x used thus:
+
+    set.Execute(out, x, ...)
+
+EscapeSet modifies the named templates in place to treat data values as plain
+text safe for embedding in an HTML document. The escaping is contextual, so
+actions can appear within JavaScript, CSS, and URI contexts without introducing'hazards.
+
+The security model used by this package assumes that template authors are
+trusted, while Execute's data parameter is not. More details are provided below.
+
+Example
+
+    tmpls, err := new(template.Set).Parse(`{{define "t'}}Hello, {{.}}!{{end}}`)
+
+when used by itself
+
+    tmpls.Execute(out, "t", "<script>alert('you have been pwned')</script>")
+
+produces
+
+    Hello, <script>alert('you have been pwned')</script>!
+
+but after securing with EscapeSet like this,
+
+    tmpls, err := EscapeSet(tmpls, "t")
+    tmpls.Execute(out, "t", ...)
+
+produces the safe, escaped HTML output
+
+    Hello, &lt;script&gt;alert('you have been pwned')&lt;/script&gt;!
+
+
+Contexts
+
+EscapeSet understands HTML, CSS, JavaScript, and URIs. It adds sanitizing
+functions to each simple action pipeline, so given the excerpt
+
+  <a href="/search?q={{.}}">{{.}}</a>
+
+EscapeSet will rewrite each {{.}} to add escaping functions where necessary,
+in this case,
+
+  <a href="/search?q={{. | urlquery}}">{{. | html}}</a>
+
+
+Errors
+
+This section describes the errors returned by EscapeSet. Each error is
+illustrated by an example that triggers the error, followed by an explanation
+of the problem.
+
+Error: "... appears in an ambiguous URL context"
+Example:
+  <a href="
+     {{if .C}}
+       /path/
+     {{else}}
+       /search?q=
+     {{end}}
+     {{.X}}
+  ">
+Discussion:
+  {{.X}} is in an ambiguous URL context since, depending on {{.C}}, it may be
+  either a URL suffix or a query parameter.
+  Moving {{.X}} into the condition removes the ambiguity:
+  <a href="{{if .C}}/path/{{.X}}{{else}}/search?q={{.X}}">
+
+
+Error: "... appears inside a comment"
+Example:
+*/
+//  <!-- {{.X}} -->
+//  <script>/* {{.X}} */</script>
+//  <style>/* {{.X}} */</style>
+/*
+Discussion:
+  {{.X}} appears inside a comment. There is no escaping convention for
+  comments. To use IE conditional comments, inject the
+  whole comment as a type string (see below).
+  To comment out code, break the {{...}}.
+
+Error: "{{if}} branches end in different contexts"
+Example:
+  {{if .C}}<a href="{{end}}{{.X}}
+Discussion:
+  EscapeSet statically examines each possible path when it encounters a {{if}},
+  {{range}}, or {{with}} to escape any following pipelines. The example is
+  ambiguous since {{.X}} might be an HTML text node, or a URL prefix in an
+  HTML attribute. EscapeSet needs to understand the context of {{.X}} to escape
+  it, but that depends on the run-time value of {{.C}}.
+
+  The problem is usually something like missing quotes or angle brackets, or
+  can be avoided by refactoring to put the two contexts into different
+  branches of an if, range or with. Adding an {{else}} might help.
+
+  First, look for a bug in your template. Missing quotes or '>' can trigger
+  this error.
+
+     {{if .C}}<div ... class="foo>{{end}}  <- No quote after foo
+
+  Second, try refactoring your template.
+
+     {{if .C}}<script>alert({{end}}{{.X}}{{if .C}})</script>{{end}}
+
+     ->
+
+     {{if .C}}<script>alert({{.X}})</script>{{else}}{{.X}}{{end}}
+
+  Third, check for {{range}}s that have no {{else}}
+
+    <a href="/search
+      {{range $i, $v := .}}
+        {{if $i}}&{{else}}?{{end}}
+        v={{$v}}
+      {{end}}
+      &x={{.X}}
+      ">
+
+  looks good, but if {{.}} is empty then the URL is /search&x=...
+  where {{.X}} is not guaranteed to be in a URL query.
+  EscapeSet cannot prove which {{range}} collections are never non-empty, so
+  add an {{else}}
+
+    <a href="{{range ...}}...{{end}}&x={{X}}">
+
+    ->
+
+    <a href="{{range ...}}...{{else}}?{{end}}&x={{.X}}">
+
+  Fourth, contact the mailing list. You may have a useful pattern that
+  EscapeSet does not yet support, and we can work with you.
+
+
+Error: "... ends in a non-text context: ..."
+Examples:
+  <div
+  <div title="no close quote>
+  <script>f()
+Discussion:
+  EscapeSet assumes the ouput is a DocumentFragment of HTML.
+  Templates that end without closing tags will trigger this warning.
+  Templates that produce incomplete Fragments should not be named
+  in the call to EscapeSet.
+
+
+If you have a helper template in your set that is not meant to produce a
+  document fragment, then do not pass its name to EscapeSet(set, ...names).
+
+    {{define "main"}} <script>{{template "helper"}}</script> {{end}}
+    {{define "helper"}} document.write(' <div title=" ') {{end}}
+
+  "helper" does not produce a valid document fragment, though it does
+  produce a valid JavaScript Program.
+
+"must specify names of top level templates"
+
+  EscapeSet does not assume that all templates in a set produce HTML.
+  Some may be helpers that produce snippets of other languages.
+  Passing in no template names is most likely an error, so EscapeSet(set) will
+  panic.
+  If you call EscapeSet with a slice of names, guard it with a len check:
+
+    if len(names) != 0 {
+      set, err := EscapeSet(set, ...names)
+    }
+
+Error: "no such template ..."
+Examples:
+   {{define "main"}}<div {{template "attrs"}}>{{end}}
+   {{define "attrs"}}href="{{.URL}}"{{end}}
+Discussion:
+  EscapeSet looks through template calls to compute the context.
+  Here the {{.URL}} in "attrs" must be treated as a URL when called from "main",
+  but if "attrs" is not in set when EscapeSet(&set, "main") is called, this
+  error will arise.
+
+Error: "on range loop re-entry: ..."
+Example:
+  {{range .}}<p class={{.}}{{end}}
+Discussion:
+  If an iteration through a range would cause it to end in
+  a different context than an earlier pass, there is no single context.
+  In the example, the <p> tag is missing a '>'.
+  EscapeSet cannot tell whether {{.}} is meant to be an HTML class or the
+  content of a broken <p> element and complains because the second iteration
+  would produce something like
+
+    <p class=foo<p class=bar
+
+Error: "unfinished escape sequence in ..."
+Example:
+  <script>alert("\{{.X}}")</script>
+Discussion:
+  EscapeSet does not support actions following a backslash.
+  This is usually an error and there are better solutions; for
+  our example
+    <script>alert("{{.X}}")</script>
+  should work, and if {{.X}} is a partial escape sequence such as
+  "xA0", give it the type ContentTypeJSStr and include the whole
+  sequence, as in
+    {`\xA0`, ContentTypeJSStr}
+
+Error: "unfinished JS regexp charset in ..."
+Example:
+    <script>var pattern = /foo[{{.Chars}}]/</script>
+Discussion:
+  EscapeSet does not support interpolation into regular expression literal
+  character sets.
+
+Error: "ZgotmplZ"
+Example:
+  <img src="{{.X}}">
+  where {{.X}} evaluates to `javascript:...`
+Discussion:
+  "ZgotmplZ" is a special value that indicates that unsafe content reached
+  a CSS or URL context at runtime. The output of the example will be
+    <img src="#ZgotmplZ">
+  If the data can be trusted, giving the string type XXX will exempt
+  it from filtering.
+
+A fuller picture
+
+The rest of this package comment may be skipped on first reading; it includes
+details necessary to understand escaping contexts and error messages. Most users
+will not need to understand these details.
+
+
+
+
+Contexts
+
+Assuming {{.}} is `O'Reilly: How are <i>you</i>?`, the table below shows
+how {{.}} appears when used in the context to the left.
+
+Context                          {{.}} After
+{{.}}                            O'Reilly: How are &lt;i&gt;you&lt;/i&gt;?
+<a title='{{.}}'>                O&#39;Reilly: How are you?
+<a href="/{{.}}">                O&#39;Reilly: How are %3ci%3eyou%3c/i%3e?
+<a href="?q={{.}}">              O&#39;Reilly%3a%20How%20are%3ci%3e...%3f
+<a onx='f("{{.}}")'>             O\x27Reilly: How are \x3ci\x3eyou...?
+<a onx='f({{.}})'>               "O\x27Reilly: How are \x3ci\x3eyou...?"
+<a onx='pattern = /{{.}}/;'>     O\x27Reilly: How are \x3ci\x3eyou...\x3f
+
+If used in an unsafe context, then the value might be filtered out:
+
+Context                          {{.}} After
+<a href="{{.}}">                 #ZgotmplZ
+
+since "O'Reilly:" is not an allowed protocol like "http:".
+
+
+If {{.}} is the innocuous word, `left`, then it can appear more widely,
+
+Context                              {{.}} After
+{{.}}                                left
+<a title='{{.}}'>                    left
+<a href='{{.}}'>                     left
+<a href='/{{.}}'>                    left
+<a href='?dir={{.}}'>                left
+<a style="border-{{.}}: 4px">        left
+<a style="align: {{.}}">             left
+<a style="background: '{{.}}'>       left
+<a style="background: url('{{.}}')>  left
+<style>p.{{.}} {color:red}</style>   left
+
+Non-string values can be used in JavaScript contexts.
+If {{.}} is
+
+  []struct{A,B string}{ "foo", "bar" }
+
+in the escaped template
+
+  <script>var pair = {{.}};</script>
+
+then the template output is
+
+  <script>var pair = {"A": "foo", "B": "bar"};</script>
+
+See package json to understand how non-string content is marshalled for
+embedding in JavaScript contexts.
+
+
+Typed Strings
+
+By default, EscapeSet assumes all pipelines produce a plain text string. It
+adds escaping pipeline stages necessary to correctly and safely embed that
+plain text string in the appropriate context.
+
+When a data value is not plain text, you can make sure it is not over-escaped
+by marking it with its type.
+
+A value that implements interface TypedStringer can carry known-safe content.
+
+  type safeHTML struct{}
+  func (s safeHTML) String() string { return `<b>World</b>` }
+  func (s safeHTML) ContentType() ContentType { return ContentTypeHTML }
+
+The template
+
+  Hello, {{.}}!
+
+can be invoked with
+
+  tmpl.Execute(out, safeHTML{})
+
+to produce
+
+  Hello, <b>World</b>!
+
+instead of the
+
+  Hello, &lt;b&gt;World&lt;b&gt;!
+
+which would have been produced if {{.}} did not implement TypedStringer.
+
+ContentTypeHTML attaches to a well-formed HTML DocumentFragment.
+Do not use it for HTML from a third-party, or HTML with unclosed tags or
+comments. The outputs of a sound HTML sanitizer and a template escaped by
+this package are examples of ContentTypeHTML.
+
+ContentTypeCSS attaches to a well-formed safe content that matches:
+(1) The CSS3 stylesheet production, for example `p { color: purple }`
+(2) The CSS3 rule production, for example `a[href=~"https:"].foo#bar`
+(3) CSS3 declaration productions, for example `color: red; margin: 2px`
+(4) The CSS3 value production, for example `rgba(0, 0, 255, 127)`
+
+ContentTypeJS attaches to a well-formed JavaScript (EcmaScript5) Expression
+production, for example `(x + y * z())`. Template authors are responsible
+for ensuring that typed expressions do not break the intended precedence and
+that there is no statement/expression ambiguity as when passing an expression
+like "{ foo: bar() }\n['foo']()" which is both a valid Expression and a valid
+Program with a very different meaning.
+
+ContentTypeJSStr attaches to a snippet of \-escaped characters that could be
+quoted to form a JavaScript string literal. For example, foo\nbar with quotes
+around it makes a valid JavaScript string literal.
+
+ContentTypeURL attaches to a URL fragment from a trusted source.
+A URL like `javascript:checkThatFormNotEditedBeforeLeavingPage()`
+from a trusted source should go in the page, but by default dynamic
+`javascript:` URLs are filtered out since they are a frequently
+successfully exploited injection vector.
+
+
+Security Model
+
+http://js-quasis-libraries-and-repl.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/safetemplate.html#problem_definition defines "safe" as used by this package.
+
+This package assumes that template authors are trusted, that Execute's data
+parameter is not, and seeks to preserve the properties below in the face
+of untrusted data:
+
+Structure Preservation Property
+"... when a template author writes an HTML tag in a safe templating language,
+the browser will interpret the corresponding portion of the output as a tag
+regardless of the values of untrusted data, and similarly for other structures
+such as attribute boundaries and JS and CSS string boundaries."
+
+Code Effect Property
+"... only code specified by the template author should run as a result of
+injecting the template output into a page and all code specified by the
+template author should run as a result of the same."
+
+Least Surprise Property
+"A developer (or code reviewer) familiar with HTML, CSS, and JavaScript;
+who knows that EscapeSet is applied should be able to look at a {{.}}
+and correctly infer what sanitization happens."
+*/
+package html
diff --git a/src/pkg/exp/template/html/escape.go b/src/pkg/exp/template/html/escape.go
index 3c0996c46a..a1816fc71c 100644
--- a/src/pkg/exp/template/html/escape.go
+++ b/src/pkg/exp/template/html/escape.go
@@ -2,9 +2,6 @@
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
-// Package html is a specialization of template that automates the
-// construction of safe HTML output.
-// INCOMPLETE.
 package html
 
 import (