From e4dafa32620e80e4e39937d8e2033fb2ee6085f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 16:54:54 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] crypto/x509: fix name constraints handling.

This change brings the behaviour of X.509 name constraints into line
with NSS[1]. In this area, the behavior specified by the RFC and by NIST
differs and this code follows the NIST behaviour.

[1] https://github.com/servo/nss/blob/master/lib/certdb/genname.c

Fixes #16347, fixes #14833.

Change-Id: I5acd1970041291c2e3936f5b1fd36f2a0338e613
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/30155
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
---
 src/crypto/x509/verify.go      | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/verify.go b/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
index 626f11bd4c..4a6c952a96 100644
--- a/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/verify.go
@@ -154,6 +154,31 @@ const (
 	rootCertificate
 )
 
+func matchNameConstraint(domain, constraint string) bool {
+	// The meaning of zero length constraints is not specified, but this
+	// code follows NSS and accepts them as valid for everything.
+	if len(constraint) == 0 {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	if len(domain) < len(constraint) {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	prefixLen := len(domain) - len(constraint)
+	if !strings.EqualFold(domain[prefixLen:], constraint) {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	if prefixLen == 0 {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	isSubdomain := domain[prefixLen-1] == '.'
+	constraintHasLeadingDot := constraint[0] == '.'
+	return isSubdomain != constraintHasLeadingDot
+}
+
 // isValid performs validity checks on the c.
 func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *VerifyOptions) error {
 	now := opts.CurrentTime
@@ -166,12 +191,9 @@ func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *V
 
 	if len(c.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 {
 		ok := false
-		for _, domain := range c.PermittedDNSDomains {
-			if opts.DNSName == domain ||
-				(strings.HasSuffix(opts.DNSName, domain) &&
-					len(opts.DNSName) >= 1+len(domain) &&
-					opts.DNSName[len(opts.DNSName)-len(domain)-1] == '.') {
-				ok = true
+		for _, constraint := range c.PermittedDNSDomains {
+			ok = matchNameConstraint(opts.DNSName, constraint)
+			if ok {
 				break
 			}
 		}
diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go b/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
index 36b500f90a..fbed1d8388 100644
--- a/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/verify_test.go
@@ -1164,6 +1164,30 @@ func TestUnknownAuthorityError(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+var nameConstraintTests = []struct {
+	constraint, domain string
+	shouldMatch        bool
+}{
+	{"", "anything.com", true},
+	{"example.com", "example.com", true},
+	{"example.com", "ExAmPle.coM", true},
+	{"example.com", "exampl1.com", false},
+	{"example.com", "www.ExAmPle.coM", true},
+	{"example.com", "notexample.com", false},
+	{".example.com", "example.com", false},
+	{".example.com", "www.example.com", true},
+	{".example.com", "www..example.com", false},
+}
+
+func TestNameConstraints(t *testing.T) {
+	for i, test := range nameConstraintTests {
+		result := matchNameConstraint(test.domain, test.constraint)
+		if result != test.shouldMatch {
+			t.Errorf("unexpected result for test #%d: domain=%s, constraint=%s, result=%t", i, test.domain, test.constraint, result)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 const selfSignedWithCommonName = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 MIIDCjCCAfKgAwIBAgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAaMQswCQYDVQQKEwJjYTEL
 MAkGA1UEAxMCY2EwHhcNMTYwODI4MTcwOTE4WhcNMjEwODI3MTcwOTE4WjAcMQsw
-- 
2.48.1